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Multicultural Reservations, Hybrid 




This paper examines the role of hybridity in culture as it relates 
to art education. Curriculum strategies in art education are based 
essentially on pluralist premises. Such strategies recognize diversity, 
honor differences, and try to redress the inequitable Eurocentric models 
of the past. Nevertheless, even in their most critical forms they 
reproduce a scheme of culture that subtly confirms the established order 
of Modern hierarchies, and fail to capture the fluid, hybrid, and uneven 
character of culture. Margaret Archer's theories of culture, society, and 
change are among the most insightful to date. Taking them on board 
will ensure that our curricula be grounded in more realistic concepts 
of culture and agency, from which art educators can build truly 
equitable curricula that recognize the implication of identities in each 
other. 
The first part of this paper looks at the kind of ideas about culture 
that form the basis of discourse in art education about multiculturalism. 
I assert that in art education cultural theory is encumbered by its reliance 
on concepts that capture the plural aggregate nature of culture, and by 
a failure to incorporate effectively the hybrid character of culture into 
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their theories. As a result art education copes inadequately with 
culture's paradoxical nature. Cultures can be distinguished, but on 
closer inspection, what looks like an organic compound reveals itself 
to be a mixture of differences. The second part proposes that Margaret 
Archer's theory of culture and her method of accounting for cultural 
change, are better and sounder premises for reflecting on culture, and 
creating curricula that cope equitably with issues of diversity, and with 
rapid or slow cultural change. In the third section of the paper I, so to 
speak, put flesh on the bones of Archer's theory by exploring historical 
examples that elucidate her ideas. The examples also illustrate how 
inequitable hierarchies of discrimination, albeit in subtle-but for that 
reason more intransigent-forms are perpetuated. 
Culture egos, good fences, and good neighbors 
How have we in art education approached, or not approached, 
the issue of hybridity and syncretism thus far? While the recognition 
of the importance of diversity has corne a long way in the United States, 
the same cannot be said for understanding the role of hybridity or the 
syncretic nature of culture. The post Civil Rights period saw the 
expansion of receptivity to multiculturalism, to the extent that it has 
become the norm to recognize the racial and ethnic diversity of the 
United States. The desire to redress past imbalances in the 
representation and inclusion of minorities meant that they had to be 
recognized and their distinct histories honored. Today most university 
foundation art programs require students to complete art history 
foundation courses that attempt to accommodate the new norm. The 
degree of success they achieve in trying to honor diversity in their 
curriculum is contingent on many factors ranging from breadth of 
content to competence and willingness of professors to implement the 
change. The ''balance,'' it is safe to say, is generally conceived in terms 
of an emphasis on "Western" art, maybe in two parts, pre-historic to 
Medieval and Renaissance to modern and Post Modern; and a required 
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non-Western course that functions as a window on diversity. Texts for 
training art teachers such as Art Works for Elementary Teachers 
(Herberholtz & Herberholtz, 2002) now in its ninth edition, and Children 
and Their Art (Hurwitz & Day, 2001) in its seventh edition, follow a 
similar distribution of space for Western and non-Western cultures. 
Not withstanding the sympathy for multiculturalism manifested by 
these institutional changes, what they mean in reality is that 
"multiculturalism" has become a distinct category alongside Euro-
American history, which is seen as the main history of consequence. 
Other texts, such as Art: Images and Ideas (Chapman, 1992) or The 
Visual Arts: A History (Honor & Fleming, 1992), deviate from the above 
formula, which herds other cultures into a 'multicultural reservation.' 
These authors attempt a more balanced representation of cultures. 
Nevertheless, both approaches confirm and leave undisturbed 
modernist assumptions about culture formation and cultural entities. 
Art teachers and their students are somehow presumed to be better off 
with a picture of stable, clearly identifiable, inviolate cultures. Justice 
and fairness are also, we are to assume, finally served by these 
approaches. The prior imbalance, namely the exclusive emphasis on 
European culture, is redressed. Difference is honored, plurality 
affirmed, the ego of all ethnic, racial, and gender constituencies were 
supposed to, and in many cases did, feel good about the improved 
status of recognition. 
Identity, culture, mixing 
At the bottom of this acceptance and satisfaction with the 
'multicultural reservation' by the majority is an understanding that 
self-esteem is important to everyone: which means an acceptance of 
some stability in the sense of self that is affected negatively and 
positively by situations. The cultural egos that were appropriately 
diminished or elevated by these formulas, on the one hand found some 
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respite from guilt (Buro-Americans) and on the other hand some 
measure of satisfaction in long unjustly withheld recognition. However, 
what is not so visible in the glare of recognized and affirmed differences 
and plurality, of nicely demarcated, easily distinguished, and neatly 
labeled different identities, is the mixed and fluid constitution of 
cultures, systems, subjects, and objects. 
One cannot be indifferent to the profound role difference plays in 
grounding identity, nor of the need for redressing past injustice. Yet 
we should not conceive of cultural selves in false and inappropriate 
terms that in the end make curricula, programs, and teachers stop short 
of equitable and democratic forms, and above all, of helping students 
and their communities have a deeper understanding of them selves 
and how their identities are created or constructed. We cannot account 
adequately especially for modern identities, which are rapidly shifting 
networks of borrowings, by using terminologies, attitudes, and 
strategies still impelled by modernist/colonial assumptions. Indeed, 
interaction between cultures, though no doubt radically affected by 
developments that make for easier communication in recent times, has 
always been a factor in cultural development and change 
(Subramanyan. 1992, Bernal, 2001). Cultural theory and teaching 
practice and training, however, have been very slow to move beyond 
theories and terminologies that capture little more than the plural 
appearance of our world. Indeed, even though theorists readily agree 
that celebratory forms of multiculturalism are encumbered by 
essentialist and presumed objective notions of culture (Chalmers, 2002), 
it is very difficult even for the critical forms to place cultural hybridity 
and fluidity at the center of their curriculum design and practice. Not 
only do we in the rarified echelons of theoretical debate continue to 
use the inadequate terms that modernity devised, but also in practice 
it is difficult to overcome attributing characteristics exclusively to the 
"West" or the "East" or to "Africans." Witness the following extracts 
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from the review of Celebrating pluralism: Art, Education, and Cultural 
Diversity (Stuhr, 1999). 
I [Patricia Stuhr] agreed with his [Don Krug] position and added: 
There is no such thing as a homogeneous culture anyway that 
you can get to know completely. There is no such thing as " an" 
African American culture or "a" Native American culture that 
you can completely get to know; there is no complete portrait of 
a culture that you can get to know by memorizing characteristics 
of it. All there is that you can get to know is individual people's 
experience based on their living within particular cultural groups 
that exists within a particular nation(s): a piece of that culture. 
And a person's cultural identity is made up of many aspects ... 
And many of these aspects of a person's cultural identity are 
always in flux and dynamic; they always move on. (p. 183) 
Here we have the affirmation of cultural fluidity and the dismissal 
of the notion that a culture can be reduced to a set of specific 
distinguishing characteristics that can be regarded as its "essence." 
Stuhr's dissolution of cultural difference comes across as rather 
absolute. However, this may be due more to the immediacy of the oral 
form of the original discussion than to any intention on her part to 
totally dissolve cultural distinctions. The important point we need to 
keep in mind is that recognition of cultural fluidity runs counter to 
ingrained notions that culture is reducible to a set of characteristics 
that so to speak generate it. 
Again the question of cultural imperialism was raised, and Don 
[Krug] remarked: 
I see them [the authors on p. 4 discussing cultural imperialism] 
advocating awareness and sensitivity, and not necessarily doing 
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anything. I think we should make a distinction. I think that 
cultural imperialism advocates one point of view. Pluralism looks 
at several perspectives. 
Mike [Michael Parsons] built on Don's comment. "But seeing 
things from multiple perspectives is a Western point of view. Just 
the idea that we should have multiple points of view on a thing 
like circumcision is a Western idea." 
Arthur [Efland] added, "cultural pluralism is a Western idea. In 
Japan they will tell you that multiculturalism is not a Japanese 
idea because they see themselves as a monoculture. People from 
Korean descent cannot obtain citizenship in Japan." (Stuhr, 1999, 
p.186) 
Here we see how easy it is to relapse into essentialist postures. It 
is as if Mike and Arthur did not agree with Stuhr's earlier declaration 
on cultural fluidity. In the heat of discussion intuitive convictions 
surface to reveal how stubborn they are to remove. In this case the 
assumption was that pluralism is a Western idea. A little reflection 
would be enough to show that something was wrong with that 
assertion. When did the West conceive of the notion of pluralism? Is 
this "Western" culture inclusive of Native Americans, African 
Americans, Asian Americans, or is it a term that refers simply to Euro-
American and European culture? It seems more like the latter, and if 
so, was that culture, which tried to rid natives of their 'backward' 
cultures, to assimilate and transform them into yellow, brown and black 
sahibs (Europeans), forever possessed of pluralism? No. Therefore, when 
and from where did the West acquire the notion of pluralism, for it 
certainly was not always a feature of the "West?" Perhaps, and this is 
questionable, pluralism is a consequence of imperialism. But since when 
was imperialism an exclusively modern, exclusively Western idea? 
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How are we to understand what occurred in the discussion that 
Stuhr made available to us? Those who took a social reconstructionist 
position are as legitimately suspicious and fearful of overemphasizing 
similarity as celebrants of plurality are of exaggerating difference. The 
former are leery of exposing similarity because it "parallels with ideas 
of assimilation" (Stuhr, 1999, p. 182-183). However, the 
reconstructionists underestimate the power of egotism in identity. Those 
cresting a wave of cultural superiority have great difficulty 
acknowledging they share something with others. Whatever is 
borrowed from others is always translated into something substantially 
different and ineffably better. Witness the above delusion that 
"pluralism" is a modern "Western/European" invention. It is one of 
several delusions that continue to bedevil art education, resulting from 
a refusal to acknowledge the incorporation of others into the 
constitutions of our selves and what we consider "our culture." 
Therefore, the fear that exposure of similarities can be an instrument of 
assimilationist motives can be as much fog to clarity of theory and 
moisture to a modern imperialist program as it is a brake on "uncritical" 
celebrations of pluralism. 
Margaret Archer and Morphogenesis 
Clearly, even though one may assert that cultures are fluid and 
(the closer we look at them) fragmented, not only do we distinguish 
cultures from each other, the habit of attributing inalienable properties 
to them is hard to overcome. In confronting the dilemma occasioned 
by similarity and difference, congruence and incongruence, harmony 
and dissonance, among and between cultures, the rejected notion of 
essences (that cultures are reducible to a set of generative 
characteristics), or something very similar in effect, steals back in to 
embarrass our critical postures. What we are faced with is the insidious 
effects of essentialist thinking, or what Margaret Archer more wisely 
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called the "Myth of cultural integration" (italics mine), appropriated by 
sociology from early anthropology, which perpetuates the image of 
culture as a coherent pattern, a uniform ethos or a symbolically 
consistent universe" (Archer, 1988, p. xv). The effect of cultural integrity 
is also produced by perspectives that are not essentialist (Archer, 1988). 
Two features of this heritage should be underlined. On the one 
hand its strong aesthetic rather than analytical orientation, which 
led to an endorsement of' "artistic" hermeneutics as the method 
for grasping the inner sense of cultural wholes'. On the other hand 
this approach, based on the intuitive understanding of cultural 
configurations, entailed a crucial prejudgment, namely an 
insistence that the coherence was there to be found, that is a mental 
closure against the discovery of cultural inconsistencies. (Archer, 
1988, p. 3) 
This "Myth" worked itself into art education through the ideas 
of McFee (1961) and others who drew on anthropology. While they 
were many positive changes in art education brought about by these 
scholars, those changes were nevertheless accompanied by 
representations of cultures as neat compact packages, and a persistent, 
even stubborn, tendency to emphasize pluralism at the expense of 
cultural hybridity and contradiction. The Myth, Archer (1988) states, 
... received monumental reinforcement by its adoption into 
Western Marxism. The notion of 'hegemonic culture' and its 
offspring, the 'dominant-ideology' thesis, embodied the same 
assumptions about cultural coherence: ... Significantly the now-
familiar reliance on aesthetic grasp dominated Marxist 
methodology here, as evidenced by the growing preoccupation 
of Euro-Marxists with literary criticism with laying bare the 
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ideological impregnation of works of art, by a kind of 'class-
decoding' which had distinct affinities with the enterprise of 
linguistic structuralism. (p. 3-4)1 . 
The critical multiculturalists and social reconstructionists resonate 
with the social transformative approach of the Marxist, but along with 
overestimating the transformative power of critical rationality-itself a 
legacy of the "enlightened" modernity-they undervalue the role of 
hybridity and syncretism in especially "Western" culture. 
The fact that hybridity, or mixture, and eclecticism are more the 
norm than the exception in culture troubled sociologists for some time, 
but ran counter to the earlier established conviction of cultural integrity. 
In tracking its disturbing presence in social theory, Archer noted that 
Sorokin, was "driven to recognize that the majority of 'Culture Systems' 
were in fact incoherent mixes" (Archer, 1988, p. 29). Nevertheless, his 
subscription to the theory of cultural coherence remained and led social 
theorists to under-value lithe positive contribution of contradiction" 
(Archer, 1988, p. 30) to cultural change. Thus one of the pivotal engines 
of cultural coherence remained unrecognized and unchallenged. The 
other was the failure to analytically separate cultural systems (CS) from 
the socio-cultural (S-C) activity of cultural agents. To elaborate following 
Archer, if one asserts that postmodern scholars and traditions of Indian 
philosophies-Hindu and Buddhist-agree that identity is constructed, 
such an assertion can be checked to see if it logically holds up. That is 
to say cultural ideas are logically related. However, to say that Indian 
philosophy influenced postmodern scholars is to look into the activities 
of people, of cultural agents, which are causally related. ''both are vital 
elements in an adequate theory of cultural stability or change" (Archer 
1988, p. 105). The prevailing tendency is to conflate or fuse the two 
into a whole, rather than recognize the different spheres within which 
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they operate. Archer identified three kinds of conflation working in 
social theory- upward, downward, and central. 
The first pair make either the 'part' or the 'people' an 
epiphenomenon of the other: ... In the one, cultural properties 
are simply formed and transformed by some untrammeled 
dominant group or placed at the mercy of capricious renegotiation 
of unconstrained agency. In the other, some cultural code or central 
value system imposes its choreography on cultural life and agents 
are reduced to trager or bearers of its properties, whether through 
oversocialization or mystification. (Archer, 1988, p. xiii) 
The third version, central conflation, has affinities to essentialism 
or the integration myth, produces similar effects, but not by recourse 
to essences, nor by making people absolute puppets of cultural systems, 
nor yet by making systems simply the tools of dominant groups. Rather, 
"the properties of cultural systems and the properties of cultural 
interaction are conflated because they are presented as being so tightly 
constitutive of one another" (Archer, 1988, p. xiii) that it is impossible 
to see where one begins and the other ends. Autonomy is effectively 
denied to the constituents of culture, both 'parts' and 'people.' 
Confla tionist theories therefore fail to account adequa tely for the forces 
occasioning cultural change and stability. Their pervasiveness in 
modern and postmodern social theory may account for the failure of 
even radical art educators to fashion curricula that move beyond 
pluralism. 
When it comes to cultural translation the presumption of cultural 
coherence leaves us with basically two options for comprehending 
others, both insurmountable. We either "'become as a child' or 'go 
native'" (Archer, 1988, p. 124). In short, there is no hope of cultures 
ever understanding each other; we have to accept that difference is an 
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insurmountable wall between groups. Indeed, as stated earlier, when 
cultures are conceived in terms of a closed circuit of cultural system 
and cultural agent, violence to personal and group integrities will be 
inevitable no matter what the circumstances of exchange between 
identities. Because ideas are held to be culture specific there is great 
resistance to seeing correspondences across cultures, and there can be 
no transmission or translation across cultures. Laboring under the 
influence of conflationist concepts of culture, critical multiculturalists 
and social reconstructionists struggle with the relativistic attitude of 
"celebratory" pluralism. For the advocates of the critical approach 
celebrating differences can amount to ignoring pernicious aspects of 
culture. Adopting the celebratory posture the educator does nothing 
to change cultures for the better. From the perspective of the critical 
multiculturalists and social reconstructionists, the "celebratory" 
approach lends itself too readily to cultural dilution and 
misrepresentation. However, we should not assume that critical and 
celebratory multiculturalists do not share the theoretical ideas of culture. 
In fact, they did. The critical multiculturalists objected to ignoring real 
injustice. They were suspicious of cross-cultural correspondences, 
which they regard as too ready an instrument of assimilation. Therefore, 
they prefer to emphasize the contemporary and seek justice and social 
improvement for living peoples, rather than focus on romanticized, 
uncertain, questionable cultural traditions (Stuhr, 1999). However, when 
delivered by teachers ensconced comfortably in the dominant culture, 
whose history is routinely recycled and has not been mangled or 
marginalized, such approaches treat others unequally. At the end of 
the day, critical multiculturalists and social reconstructivists treat culture 
as an integrated coherent whole, in which the part needs the context of 
the whole to be truly understood. With such a formula of culture in 
place the critical and reconstructivist camp has little choice but to invoke 
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some moral superiority to justify their critique. How then to get pass 
the problem of contextual dependence? 
In Archer's opinion the problem of contextual dependence is a 
methodological one. 
"It stemmed from attempting to deal with the Cultural System 
and Socio-Cultural life simultaneously because they are 
intertwined. Instead I suggest that the death-trap can be skirted 
by proceeding more slowly. Specifically this involves examining 
the Cultural System first, in isolation from social life, before 
addressing the Socio-culturallevel and then the relations between 
them" (Archer, 1988, pp 133-4). 
Analytical dualism solves the problem created by trying to do 
too much at one time. Let me turn again to Archer to clarify her method. 
Consequently, analytical dualism is, first, based on the premises 
that the CS [cultural system] originates from the S-C [socio-
cultural] level (culture is man-made), but, second, that over time 
a stream of intelligibilia, escape their progenitors and acquire 
autonomy as denizens of World Three, after which time we can 
examine how they act back on subsequent generations of people. 
Third, that since people go on making culture we can investigate 
how new items enter the CS and old ones are displaced, providing 
time is specified. Of course both CS and S-C effects are at work 
simultaneously throughout history, but it is impossible to unpack 
their morphogenetic or morphostatic contributions without 
making use of analytical dualism to disengage temporal cycles 
of Cultural ConditioninglE Cultural interaction lE Cultural 
Elaboration. (Archer, 1988, p 144) 
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Archer's ideas about culture correspond to those arrived at by 
Peter Burger about art objects in his Theory of the Avant Garde (1984), 
but there is an ironic aspect to this correspondence, for while she saw 
'artistic hermeneutics' as linked to the generation of "coherent" 
concepts, he saw 'artistic hermeneutics' as a traditional European 
aesthetic attitude that had to be superceded by another embedded and 
embodied in montage (and I would add collage and assemblage). "It 
[the art work] is no longer the harmony of the individual parts that 
constitute the whole2 ; it is the contradictory relationship of 
heterogeneous elements" (Burger, 1984, p. 82). Burger saw the organic 
notions as coincident with classical European aesthetics and art 
(Renaissance to Post-impressionists and possibly analytical Cubists), 
culminating and persisting in Romantic ideas. He saw the non-organic, 
or more mechanical, notion of art as coincident with the constructive 
montage type works of the early twentieth century. Burger perceptively 
realized that the classical hermeneutics premised on integrated art 
objects had to be replaced and states, "a critical hermeneutics will 
replace the theorem of necessary agreement of parts and whole by 
investigating the contradiction between various layers and only then 
infer the meaning of the whole" (Burger, 1984 p. 82). Working out a 
theory of culture and a method of cultural analysis Archer arrive a 
similar realization. Where Archer advances over Burger is in the 
realization that the traditional concepts of society, and of art objects, 
were in fact flawed; the notions of coherence and unity were short 
sighted from the start. Classical aesthetics, which Burger sees related 
to, and which conceived of, the "organic" art object, effectively 
overlooked the fact that such objects were a construction or 
"assemblage" that worked with contradictions such as pigment, strokes, 
and the like. The fact is, at one moment an object may be regarded as 
organic and at another it may be regarded as mechanical. 
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Culture and Collage 
In trying to make sense of the conundrum of cultural identity, 
which at one moment appears as an organic coherent entity, and at 
another (with more penetrating inspection) disappears into fragments 
of different individuals, I have suggested that Archer and Burger offer 
us theoretical perspectives for making sense of the confusion. A 
conundrum made even more complex by cultural interaction and 
change. In what follows I want to present some examples that show 
not only the intertwined nature of the activity of cultural agent and 
cultural ideas, but also the need to analytically distinguish them from 
each other, as recommended by Archer. Invariably, inflated identity, 
coupled with the assumption of cultural coherence, functions as a 
distraction to recognizing correspondences and a tendency to 
misrepresent interaction. 
I will start with the irony that Burger's recognition of a 
coincidence of montage with the 'non organic' aspect of art objects 
hardly ever prompts scholars to ask such questions as "if collage and 
montage suggested such ideas to Burger, could similar ideas be found 
in African cultures?" Such questions never, or very rarely arise, blocked 
by the thickness of the presumption of culturally coherent identity, and 
by the persistent presumption that the ideas are culturally unique, in 
this case uniquely European. This happens in relation to other non-
Western cultures as well, but with African culture the stakes are higher. 
The incredible prospect of 'primitive tribal" people having thoughts 
as sophisticated as modern advanced Europeans, even-more 
inconceivably-postmodern ones, strikes at the heart of modern social 
hierarchies of dominance. This is not China or India; this is Africa, the 
synonym of backwardness, and the antonym of Europeanness. When 
critical theorists, of whatever ilk, presume that a critical emphasis on 
difference will rescue African Americans, Africans, and any other ethnic 
or racial group from assimilation, that presumption is often oblivious 
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of European affective investments in their "difference," and to that 
extent they are subtly complicit with modern imperial structures of 
dominance. 
Since it is perhaps easier to imagine that kind of ideological 
correspondence and traffic taking place between Asian and European 
cultures, it is fortunate that Martin Powers supplies us with an 
appropriate example. The issue in question is historical accounts of 
formalist aesthetics. Having shown that Roger Fry, one of its leading 
theorists, drew heavily on Chinese aesthetics (Powers, 1995), Powers 
makes the following statement. 
The nineteenth- and twentieth-century rejection of mimetic 
standards in deference to expressive ideals is regarded as one of 
those great achievements unique to Western culture. How do we 
deal with the fact-emotionally and historically-that one of the chief 
ideologues of this movement threw his weight behind key terms 
and issues embedded in Chinese criticism? The situation is distinct 
from, say, Picasso's use of non-European art, for Fry was not reading 
modern sentiments into works of another culture (italics mine). Quite 
the contrary, he was entertaining constructs found in Chinese 
sources from early times, such constructs being made accessible 
via the works of Binyon and Herbert Giles, albeit through the 
filter of late Romantic interpretation. (p. 5) 
The question for mainstream art education is whether it is ready 
to confront such questions as Powers is willing to ask? So far 
multiculturalism has been blissfully oblivious of them or have skirted 
them. Formalist aesthetics is treated as exclusively a modem invention, 
imposed on others. I will elaborate on the italicized portion of the 
quotation later; Powers (1995) has more to say that we should hear. 
To try to make sense of this situation in terms of "influence" would 
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lock us into the rhetoric of nationalism-let us put that option aside. 
A more fashionable approach might be to dismiss Fry's interest 
in Chinese art theory as part of a colonialist discourse designed 
to disguise European exploitation of Asia, hiding appropriation 
beneath a camouflage of "appreciation." But this interpretation 
would not so much expose colonialism as promote it, for it 
effectively reduces the Chinese discourse-which had its own social 
agenda-to the status of a mere ornament of Fry's imperialist 
ambitions. More important, such an approach robs the historian 
of the possibility of understanding "illusion-versus-expression" 
discourses as anything other than the peculiar symptom of the 
essence of European culture in the modern epoch. If we are truly 
to entertain the possibility of general theories about culture, as 
our ancestors in the eighteenth century set out to do-yet wish to 
avoid nationalistic rhetoric-in the end it might be better to face 
the possibility that the illusion-versus-expression trope is not 
unique to the "West." 
This need not cause anxiety. Indeed, one could see in it an 
opportunity to make positive use of the counterchange condition3 , 
for in such a case it is evident that any description of the "modern" 
theory of art limited to European experience is incomplete. (Italics mine) 
(pp.5-6) 
Can art education rise to the task implied in that last sentence? 
Can we confront the hybridity that it implies? The mulatto mestizo 
culture that passes as exclusively European can only be partially 
understood when its "other" aspects are left out. What the example 
above illustrates, however, is the causal relationship that obtains when 
we are dealing with how cultural agents use ideas, in this case from 
the Far East, to fill the need for a new aesthetic, in this case Europe's. 
However, Powers' caution against reducing Chinese discourse to the 
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status of being a mere ornament of Fry's imperial ambitions, needs to 
be expanded if formalist aesthetic ideas are not simply to be an 
ornament of Chinese culture. Indeed, it is only when we acknowledge 
that cultural ideas, like artifacts, become autonomous once generated, 
that they cannot be reduced to a decorative status in relation to any 
culture. Analytical dualism, therefore, is pivotal to getting around 
cultural chauvinism. 
Let me turn to the italicized portion of the earlier quote where 
Powers fails to be sufficiently informed and critical of conventional 
interpretations of modern European art and typically dismisses African 
intelligence. "The situation is distinct from, say, Picasso's use of non-
European art, for Fry was not reading modern sentiments into works of another 
culture" (italics mine) (Powers, 1995, p. 5.). Let us keep in mind that he 
understood that these were issues that Europeans have to deal with 
emotionally as well as historically and critically. In other words, this is 
not often seen as an issue with risks to European self-esteem. Self-esteem 
issues always concern minorities. What do I see when I revisit Picasso 
and the Cubist moment? It is ironic that Fry drew on Chinese aesthetics 
to justify what was a 'new' art form for Europe, modeled predominately 
by Africans. 
The modern/primitive binary, with the latter regarded as just a 
source of raw cultural material for the former, was a fundamental aspect 
of the way modernist European scholarship represented the relationship 
between European culture and colonized dominated others. An 
important role of this scholarship was to distance and divorce Modern 
art from the 'primitive' and/or 'un dynamic' other cultures that were 
the source of the principles of the modern forms. Texts on Cubism, and 
Picasso in particular, are good examples of how this motive operates 
to relegate, in this case African culture, to the mere raw material and 
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footnote status, keeping it a safe distance from crucial aspects of modem 
art. 
The typical text on Picasso restricts the 'influence' of African art 
to a specific limited body of works by Picasso. According to Alfred 
Barr, this limited set of works was call by some "the Negro Period" 
(e.g. Women in Yellow, 1907, Dancer, 1907). He preferred the term "proto-
cubist" (Barr, 1966, p. 61). Even though later authors did not use these 
terms the restriction of the influence of African art to that particular 
group of works has remained the norm, thereby African art's 
relationship to modern art was restricted to a limited ideological and 
stylistic space and to a very superficial effect. The chance that modern 
European art could be deeply blackened, that the modern innovation 
in art, especially a movement as pivotal to it as Cubism, could be deeply 
hybrid, had to be nullified. Scholarship on Picasso, Cubism, and modern 
art generally, simply rallied to the task; it simply refused to entertain 
any thought of other than superficial import from Africa into Cubism. 
Though he may hardly have been aware of it as fear, Barr 
articulated his culture's insecurity very clearly, and established the 
method of distancing in his description of the works of "the Negro 
period." 
The dancer, recklessly distorted, dramatic in movement and 
decorative in color is the masterpiece of a brief barbaric phase of 
the Negro period. . . . By the end of 1907 Picasso had passed 
through the barbaric phase of his "Negro" period. Though there 
are traces of both Negro and Iberian sculpture in many works of 
1908, Picasso no longer depends explicitly on either. It would be 
better to call the paintings of this period "proto-cubist" rather 
than "Negro" as has been customary. (Barr, 1966, p. 61) 
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African influence had to be kept away from those later works in 
which Picasso manifests a fluent familiarity with the conceptual 
approach of African artists. Such works as the Bull's Head (1944, bicycle 
handle bars and seat), Baboon and Young (1951), and The Three Musicians 
(1921)-the Jazz flavor of which, though more an intuitive than objective 
perception, nevertheless-are evidence of a mature understanding of 
the formative principles used by the African artist. The only thing 
"barbaric" about Picasso's Negro period was his crude assumptions 
regarding their mode of operation and the sophisticated thinking 
behind them. In his "Negro" phase, Picasso was really working with 
the typical European notions of Africans as savage, undisciplined, 
irrational, and spontaneous because of undisciplined emotionality, a 
far cry from the disciplined conceptual approach to form that was the 
actual approach of African artists. Barr's distancing was twofold, 
restricting African influence to a narrow period and set of works, and 
making that period one in which Iberian and African art influenced 
Picasso. Hence proto-cubism removes even the word 'Negro' from the 
equation and makes the art of that limited number of works a set that 
is not-yet cubism proper. Because he was deeply embedded in European 
traditions, Picasso in fact had to trek, or if you prefer detour, through 
analytical and synthetic Cubism to arrive at the conceptual freedom to 
play with objects and images the way he was able to do in The Dance 
(1925), Guernica (1937), Night Fishing in Antebes (1939), and the works 
mentioned above, among others. What I am asserting here is that 
Picasso only became fluent with the formal principles of "African" or 
primitive art at this point, not before. This contradicts the tradition 
that Barr put in place, which remains substantially intact through 
scholarly silence and indifference. Even when it is pointed out that 
notions of barbarism are projections of European prejudice, as for 
example by Powers, there is no accompanying evidence that African 
cultures had developed ideas about representation that occasioned the 
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higher value accorded to conceptual representation, and there was 
nothing more unconscious about their achievement than that of any 
other culture's. 
We can understand the racial interests that underwrote Barr's 
reading of Picasso's work and modern art; however, it is also difficult 
for critical texts to keep in sight the hybrid nature of Cubism and 
modern European art, even when there is a much needed corrective 
focus on rescuing African art objects from mere tributary status to 
European culture. That tributary relationship was still evident, some 
felt, in such shows as Primitivism in 20th-Century Art (Museum of 
Modern Art. 1984), that sought to account for the considerable 
fascination of modern European culture with "primitive" cultures. 
Torgovnick (1990) for example, felt 
The exhibition reenacted the dynamics of colonialism by positing 
the importance of primitive production solely in terms of their 
relationship to modern art. Such a maneuver takes objects 
reflecting a wholly different modes of sociat economic, and religious 
experience [italics mine] and neutralizes them by making them 
part of Western cultural history (53-55). This is what happens 
when we lose interest in the objects as African-in their 
independent history, functions, and traditions-to focus instead 
on how they affected Western artists. (p.122) 
This is the liberal! critical side of the equation, which in this case, 
sides with anthropologists and would have us look at African, and 
non-Western objects in generat in their own historical contexts and for 
themselves. However, in the italicized portion we can detect the 
persistence of the coherent or organic concept of culture. Invaluable as 
they are, such critical approaches are too restricted by their defensive 
positions to situate their critiques in a more dynamic concept of culture. 
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Cultures are kept completely distinct, even though all along modern 
art objects are patently the products of the colonial relationship and 
should be seen as hybrid. We will recall that in fact the initial reaction 
to modern movements, such as fauvism, dismissed them as non-
European and despicable, hence the (initially) derogatory epithets, Les 
Fauves, Les Cubes. Both the art historical approach, which emphasized 
formal borrowing, and the anthropological approach, which 
emphasized European misreading and violation of African cultural 
integrities, have conspired to obscure the hybridity of modern art objects 
and African art objects. Despite the competition between the two 
approaches, both subscribed to the notion of neat convenient cultural 
plurality. They effectively sustained the prevailing myth of dynamic 
modern over static traditional culture, and blocked any question of 
deeper ideological correspondences existing between "African" and 
"European" cultures. 
But what deeper connections or correspondences could there be? 
In order to answer this question, let us keep in mind that each carries 
with it a distinct presumption about Africans and African art. "Jazz" 
as a musical form is quite distinct from the lyrics that may accompany 
a particular piece. Few would question now whether Black musicians 
understood the sophisticated nature of the musical form they generated. 
The same did not and does not hold true for the conceptual approach 
to form that African artists used. The traditional African artists still 
carry the stigma of being unconscious of even the significance of his or 
her conceptual approach. Griaule's (1966, p. 37) work with the Dogon 
indicates that they were perfectly well aware they were working 
conceptually. Other studies indicate that this understanding was not 
exclusive to the Dogon (Peek, p. 2000). In this respect modern Europe 
and Africa now share at the formal level similar tastes. They enjoy a 
conceptual approach to creating and representing, novel for early 
twentieth century Europe and Euro-America, but not for Africans. The 
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fact that, according to Powers, Fry had to draw on traditional Chinese 
aesthetics to conceive of the "new" aesthetic, formalism, to explain the 
"new" art forms, illustrates that the relations connecting the three 
cultures can only be partly explained by the intervening historical 
events. Chinese aesthetics would have been of no use to Fry without 
its formalist bent, and Fry would not have needed formalists aesthetics 
were it not for the preoccupation of the Cubists with the formal 
techniques of African artists. This is why Archer's methodology of 
separating the "logically" related-in this case formalist aspects, from 
the causally related-in this case a network of colonial historical relations 
facilitating the transmission of cultural ideas, is effective in 
disentangling how the different moments in the dynamic of culture 
work. 
However, there is another strand of the "modern" story that is 
illustrative of how important it is to incorporate the notion of hybridity 
into social and cultural theory. I am speaking generally of Picasso's 
use of Greek mythological imagery in his work, and specifically of the 
Minotaur and bull imagery. The Minotaur imagery is one among other 
"classical" reflections that take or direct Picasso and his culture's gaze 
back to an ancient Mediterranean moment in Afro-European relations. 
The Minotaur is certainly a figure engaging some of Picasso's and his 
culture's brute and blind impulses. But how ironic it is that having 
comprehended the formal principles of African art, Picasso apparently, 
but only apparently, turns back to his pure European "roots," which 
turn out to be full of African imports. 
That is at least the opinion of some scholars such as Bernal (1988), 
who has exposed the part a deeply institutionalized racism had to play 
in 'purging' classical Greek culture of any African or Semitic influences. 
The same forces worked subtly as an effective blinker to direct all 
interpretations of Picasso's work from considering any connection to 
Africa in his "post-cubist" work. Bernal (1991, p. 166-171) traced the 
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Minotaur myth to an African-Egyptian origin, the god Min, and a phallic 
deity. And Griaule's research among the Dogon led him to see in their 
myths deep connections to European Mediterranean mythology; "ram 
with calabash-sun its head, alternating with a bull similarly equipped, 
had first excited his curiosity" (Griaule, 1966, p. 209-216). Griaule, 
following the conventions of his time, still distinguished Mediterranean 
cultures from "African" ones, thus lumping ancient Egypt and North 
Africa with southern European Mediterranean cultures. 
Notwithstanding Griaule's limitations, he provides the information 
necessary for us to revise our thinking. Given that the basis of Picasso's 
radical renovation of his "style" started from a fascination with, but 
profound misunderstanding of, African art, his mature work can be 
said to have arrived at an insight about African culture that was 
comprehensive of the depths of its relations to Europe. Unlike artists, 
scholars, from either anthropology or art history, seemed unwilling to 
cross the boundaries of culture to make the connections even though 
the information was available. 
Clearly, our investment in relatively impermeable cultural 
boundaries is deep. Though we have to acknowledge difference and 
plurality, the ever-shifting character of identity means we have to found 
our sense of secure identity on a different basis. To use an analogy, we 
cannot continue to presume we need to build houses when we have 
woken up to find ourselves living, not on land, but on the sea. A ship is 
needed, not a house. Furthermore, the redress of past injustices cannot 
be accomplished by ignoring the profound intersubjectivity of the past 
as well as the present. This is why even the critical multiculturalists 
fail to redress the profoundest of injustices when they resist seeing 
similarities on the pretext that it will dilute culture. By so doing they 
persist with the notion of culture as an organic complex, and not as a 
constellation of elements, from which appropriations and other 
configurations can be made. 
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Conclusion: Beyond nationalism and multicultural 
reservations. 
If multiculturalism is to move on from the 'safe' pluralism that it 
has thus far inhabited it must be premised on a theory that captures 
the dynamic character of culture. It must represent its historical 
diversity, the emergence, migration, and variation of ideas and people; 
how cultures interact and change, why they remain relatively stable or 
radically change. Such a goal certainly cannot be accomplished by 
sanitizing cultures and histories of their gross and callous aspects; but 
presuming that exposing similarities, correspondences, and substantial 
borrowing will compromise cultural integrity also cannot do it. What 
is more likely is the perpetuation of skewed cultural relations. Quite 
simply, cultural theory in art education must take the pervasiveness of 
cultural hybridity and syncretism into account, if it is to get past 
callousness and hypersensitivity. 
To make the case for centralizing hybridity in cultural theory I 
have attempted to show several things. First; even with the best will in 
the world, it is hard to escape the intuitive perception of cultures as 
different coherent, indeed organic, wholes, in spite of having knowledge 
that reveals the fragmented character of culture (Stuhr. 1999). 
Second, in this regard Archer's theory of morphogenesis is most 
useful. Its central feature of analytical dualism, wherein she insists we 
allow cultural products autonomy from cultural agents, is an effective 
way of grasping the process of cultural stability and change. By so doing 
Archer avoids the major pitfalls of established cultural theories. The 
first of the pitfalls is conflation, which is the tendency in social theory 
to (a) either make people the puppets of cultural or social system, or 
(b) make cultural systems a mere tool of the manipulative whims of 
powerful agents, and (3) conceive of socio-cultural products and 
producers as caught in so tight a circuit of interdependence that change 
cannot be properly accounted for. Even though those concepts may 
not be strictly speaking essentialist, they nevertheless leave us with 
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the perception of cultural coherence at the expense of seeing cultural 
contradictions. Another pitfall, contextual dependence, also a product 
of conflation, supplies arguments for the kind of cultural relativism 
celebratory multiculturalism is criticized for, but which create a 
dilemma for social reconstructionists and critical multiculturalists 
seeking a more radical social justice. The contextualist argument is 
problematic to radical multiculturalists and social reconstructivists 
because it diminishes the role of contradiction in culture. They are left 
with little choice but to invoke human rights, which appears always to 
be the imposition of Western values. Their subscription to the notions 
of cultural coherence, integrity, and to contextualism, prevents the 
invocation of contradictions within culture. Three, it concedes 
autonomy to ideas and to human agents so that they can historically 
act on each other without one reduced to being the helpless product of 
the other. 
Third and finally, through the examination of historical examples 
I attempt to put flesh, as it were, on the bones of Archer's cultural 
theory. I also seek to highlight the hybrid nature of past and present 
culture and the need to get beyond hypersensitivity and callousness, 
cognizant that issues of self-esteem are caught up in art education and 
culture. 
Art educators must avoid confusing cultural objects and cultural 
producers into "organic" interdependencies that effectively make them 
comprehensible only to cultural insiders. Recognizing and representing 
specific nuances of given similarities in different cultures, within the 
context of the morphogenetic approach, exposes the much more uneven 
development of cultures, and makes "progress" less loaded with 
modern presumptions. Our appreciation, recognition, and preservation 
of difference within and among cultures will not be rooted in over-
sensitivity to their "integrity" oblivious of contradictions, nor in 
sustaining the flawed conventional notion of a progressive West trailed 
by a set of tributary cultures desperate to catch up. Rather, by inserting 
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all cultures into a dynamic notion of culture, the past and present of 
each and every culture can be represented as having dynamic 
implications for each other. Furthermore, the nuances that differences 
and similarities acquire from the interaction of cultural systems or 
products, agents, and historical situations can be more clearly grasped 
along with their contingent character. The promise is of the possibility 
of comprehending the dynamic nature of cultural interflows and what 
they mean, and of a more equitable representation of diversity in 
curricula. 
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Notes 
1 Archer does not mean to say that cultures are not in dominant 
and subordinate relations to each other, rather she is emphasizing the 
fact that the explanations hark back to the premise of cultural 
integration. 
2 Compare to Archer (1988) "One would simply say that the Myth 
portrayed culture as the perfectly integrated system, in which every 
element was interdependent with every other-the ultimate exemplar 
of compact coherent organization" (p. 2). 
